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The large differences among advanced OECD countries in the shares of workers that are 
employed by the government can probably only to a small part be explained by factors that 
are in the center of modern organization theory explanations for public vs. private 
ownership. This paper explores a new hypothesis for explaining the share of government 
employment. It is based on asymmetric information about individual worker productivity 
between the taxman, and workers and their employers. Hence, government employment 
opens up policy options, not available with only private production. The hypothesis is that 
government employment is an efficient element of redistribution policy. The mechanism is 
that the government can, through its employment policy, increase the relative scarcity in the 
private sector of the workers the government wants to redistribute in favor of. That increases 
their wages and lowers the need for redistribution through the tax- and transfer systems, 
which mitigates distortions. One can therefore expect large government employment in 
countries where the tolerance of inequality is low.  
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1. Introduction 
The role of government in-house production of goods and services is a longstanding and 
central economic and political issue. For long the issue was highly relevant in the context of 
the debate about central planning vs. markets and the related issue, socialism vs. capitalism. 
Essentially, that debate was about which economic system is better in delivering social 
welfare (see, von Mises (1974) and Lange (1936)). Now when that debate is no longer 
active, other issues are in the forefront such as effects of government in-house production on 
unemployment (see Yann, Cahuc and Zylberberg (2002)), how choices between private and 
government in-house production affect political processes and outcomes (see Alesina, 
Danninger and Rostagno (2002)) and the boundary between government in-house production 
and private production in mixed economies. The theoretical analyses of private vs. public 
production in mixed economies are welfare oriented and in the context of partial equilibrium 
models in which ownership plays a role because of asymmetric information and incomplete 
contracts
 (see Laffont and Tirole (1993), Tirole (1992) on asymmetric information and, Hart, 
Vishny and Schleifer (1997) and Schleifer (1998) incomplete contracts).
 2 
This paper deals with the boundary between government in-house and private 
production from a new and different perspective. Rather than focusing on particular 
characteristics of the commodities produced or the internal organization of firms, the issue in 
this paper is effects of government employment on the distribution of labor income. The 
reasons for taking this perspective is that there are significant differences between advanced 
OECD countries in the share of the workforce that is employed by the government. Hence, 
in Denmark, Norway and Sweden governments account for some 30% of total employment 
while governments in Germany and the US employ some 15% of the total workforce. Those 
large differences in employment shares among different countries can probably not be fully 
explained by differences in which information different agents have available, differences in 
completeness of contracts or by differences in which commodities that are produced in 
different countries.  
Table 1: Government employment as a percentage of total employment and Gini-
coefficients for equivalent disposable household income per individual (mid 90s). OECD 
(1999). 
                                                 
2 There are also empirically oriented studies, see e.g., López-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and 
Vickers and Yarrow (1991).   2 
Country 1960 1968 1974 1984 1994 Ginicoeff.
Italy 13.4 15.1 16.2 34.2
US 14.7 17.0 16.1 14.8 14.5 33.3
UK 16.4 17.5 19.6 21.7 20.4 30.4
Germany 8.1 10.9 13.0 15.5 15.1 28.2
France 17.4 22.1 24.8 27.7
Norway 15.4 19.0 25.2 30.6 24.9
Sweden 12.8 18.4 24.8 32.7 32.0 24.7
Finland 7.7 11.0 13.8 19.6 25.1 23.4
Denmark 15.2 22.2 30.2 31.0 20.5  
However, an instance where there are significant and important differences among 
the advanced OECD countries is in their tolerance of income inequality. That is clearly 
manifested in different degrees of progressivity of tax- and income support systems. 
Denmark, Norway and Sweden are doubtless among countries in the lower end of the scale 
while income inequality seems much more acceptable in, e.g., the US.
 Hence, it appears that 
countries that have large shares of government employment are also countries that have low 
tolerance of income inequality.
3 Table 1 reports employment shares and Gini-coefficients for 
a number of OECD countries. A potential explanation for such a pattern is that extensive 
redistribution through the tax- and transfer systems give rise to large distortions and that 
government employment and in-house production might have a role to play to mitigate 
these.
4 
Such a role is possible because a major source of income inequality is wage 
inequality and a government that is a large player on the labor market can affect the market 
outcome. A channel for that when the private sector labor market is competitive and the 
government offers the same working conditions as private producers (the government 
adheres to horizontal equity) is that the government deviates from cost minimizing factor 
demand and uses the workers that are favored by the redistribution more intensively. Such a 
policy increases the relative demand for and the wages of the favored workers and it reduces 
the need for redistribution through the tax- and transfer systems. However, a large deviation 
from the cost-minimizing factor mix in a small part of the economy causes large distortions 
                                                 
3 Germany might seem as a disturbing observation in this context. However, in Germany health-care production 
is to large extent carried out by non-profit organizations and therefore not recorded as public production. To 
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4 Another, more ideological explanation is that low tolerance against income inequality is an important element 
of left-wing political views and people holding such views are usually more favorable to government in-house 
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and is in some cases not even feasible.
5 Therefore, extending the range of goods and services 
that are produced in-house by the government can potentially reduce the efficiency cost of 
such a policy. That creates a link between the degree of redistribution and the size of 
government production. 
However, according to the micro-oriented analyses based on asymmetric information 
and incomplete contracts different types of production are differently suitable for 
government ownership. For some types production such as running foreign policy or setting 
up and training the army government in-house production is the only realistic alternative. For 
other types of production, such as fashion clothes or consumer electronics, private ownership 
seems to be the only realistic alternative. This implies that the interesting border-line cases 
for government ownership and wage affecting policies are those where first, private 
ownership is the more efficient alternative but the loss of internal efficiency under 
government ownership is not large and, second, the production technology allows factor 
substitution at low cost.
6 Little loss of internal efficiency under government ownership 
implies that state-of-the-art technology as well as consumer demand should be well known 
and not shifting too rapidly.  
There are of course other wage affecting policy options open to the government. It 
can for example hold back sectors that use unfavored workers intensively and expand sectors 
that use favored workers intensively.
7 Government ownership is not generally required for 
such a policy but may be needed in cases where it is desirable from an income distribution 
point of view to hold back a sector while its output cannot be priced too highly. Suppose for 
instance that the government wants to hold back spending on health care because that sector 
employs high skilled workers intensively. If it, at the same time, wants health care to be 
available to those who need it, prices might not be the best rationing device. Screening by 
doctors and physical rationing may perform better than prices alone but such rationing 
system may not function well under private ownership where high-powered incentives are in 
action.  
                                                 
5 Technology may not allow factor substitution. 
6 The implication is not that government ownership of low-wage intensive production is particularly interesting. 
7 In cases where the government wants to hold back a sector it should be possible to identify consumption for 
which consumer surplus is low or in cases where consumption is paid for by an insurer, consumption that is 
worth less than its cost.   4 
The analysis in this paper addresses only two issues namely the size of public 
production and to what extent the government should deviate from cost-minimizing factor 
demand in order to achieve constrained Pareto-efficiency. The analysis builds on the same 
lack of information on the part of governments as that manifested in tax schedules and 
assumed in theories of optimum income taxation (see, Mirrlees (1971)). Hence, the 
government, as a tax collector, can adequately observe income at individual worker level but 
it cannot observe productivity or wage per hour, and number of hours worked at that level. 
However, each worker and his or her employer know the worker’s productivity. That lack of 
information on the part of the government is an obstacle to subsidies (or similar measures) to 
the use of low wage workers since such a policy would have to rely on truthful reporting in 
cases where false reporting is feasible and beneficial. However, when the government is the 
employer it is reasonable to assume that it has the very same information about its 
employees as private employers about its employees. Hence, government employment opens 
up a policy option that is otherwise not available. The government can for example use low-
wage workers more intensively than private producers would for the corresponding 
production. That would increase the relative demand for low-wage workers, which tends to 
increase wages of those workers and reduce the need for transfers. 
The analysis is related to the discussion about whether production efficiency (i.e., 
marginal rates of transformation between factors are the same in all production units) is 
desirable or not (see Diamond and Mirrlees (1971), Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1971, 1972) for 
early contributions and Naito (2000) for a recent contribution).
8 Naito (2000) is the closest to 
the analysis here in that the motivation for the deviation from cost efficiency at going market 
wages for a public producer is distortions caused by optimum non-linear income taxation. 
The most important difference between the previous analyses and the analysis in this paper is 
that the boundary between government in-house production and private production is 
assumed in those analyses while it is endogenous in this analysis. Another difference is that 
in our analysis the public sector produces the same commodity as the private sector. That 
feature of the model reflects the fact that certain commodities are in some countries 
                                                 
8 In this literature the reason for production inefficiency is some (in many cases exogenous) restriction on the 
set of feasible tax instruments. Our model is similar in this respect but the restriction on tax instruments is 
determined endogenously since we employ an income tax the design of which is only restricted by standard 
self-selection constraints.   5 
produced by private firms and in other in-house by the government. Previous studies do not 
address the issue of boundary between government in-house- and private production.  
The model in this paper essentially is the Stiglitz (1982) two types of workers 
optimum non-linear income taxation model with endogenously determined wages. The two 
types of workers are the less- and the more productive workers where the former are called 
the unskilled and the latter the skilled workers. Only one consumption good, which is a 
private good, is produced with the two types of labor. In addition to Stiglitz (1982) we add 
the option for the government to produce commodities in-house. The government and 
private producers have access to essentially the same production technology which offers 
some limited substitution possibilities between the two types of labor (the elasticity of 
substitution is strictly larger than zero and not infinity).
9 Due to weaker incentives on the 
part of the government, compared to private entrepreneurs (who are residual claimants and 
face hard budget constraints) to quickly reduce cost and to change products when market 
conditions alter we assume that government in-house production is subjected to some waste. 
Hence, we assume a factor neutral lower productivity in government in-house production as 
compared to private production. That assumption limits the size of government in-house 
production. The analysis is normative in the sense that we explore Pareto-efficient policies. 
However, it can be argued that such an approach might have predictive power since Pareto-
efficient policies can be expected to dominate non-efficient policies as election programs 
(see Wittman (1989). Our position on this issue is open because although allocations that are 
Pareto efficient dominate some non-efficient allocations it seems quite possible that the 
bargaining and coordination processes that are required to reach efficiency can fail. Our view 
is therefore that the efficiency approach is a first attempt to model the issue.      
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the equilibrium model is presented. 
Section 3 deals with dominant policies. We show three results. The first is for situations 
where the incentive compatibility constraints do not bind. In those situations government in-
house production is not part of Pareto-efficient policies. The second and the third results are 
for situations where one of the incentive compatibility constraints binds. In those situations 
(i) government in-house production enhances efficiency and (ii) it is indeed efficient that the 
government tilts factor intensity towards the favored type of worker as compared to the cost 
efficient intensity at going market wages. In this model it is never  efficient that the 
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government is cost efficient at going market wages. In Section 4 we carry out a series of 
simulations in order to obtain information on the size of government employment. Hence, 
we calculate solutions for government employment of the two types of workers for different 
income distributions under somewhat realistic parameter assumptions. The results of the 
simulations are that with ambitious redistribution the efficient level of government 
employment is significant and factor intensities are significantly tilted against low-wage 
workers. It therefore seems that differences in the degree of tolerance against income 
inequality can potentially explain the large differences in the sizes of government 
employment among advanced OECD countries. 
2. Model 
The model relies as much as possible only on technological factors and competitive behavior 
of private agents. A critical choice is how to model the technology for redistribution. We 
have chosen to not impose other constraints on it than those given by the lack of information 
on the part of the government and horizontal equity. Additional artificial constraints on for 
example the tax system would lead to efficiency costs, which may be possible to eliminate 
through democratic decisions. For those reasons we assume that the government imposes 
non-linear income taxation and employs workers to produce the consumer good in-house so 
as to achieve (information) constrained Pareto-efficiency. 
2.1. Individuals 
Consider an economy with two types of workers indexed  2 , 1 = i and two types of work. 
There are  i n individuals of type i. Type 2 workers are assumed to be skilled workers and type 
1 workers to be the unskilled. The market wage rates (which are endogenously determined) 
for the two types of work are  2 , 1 , = i wi . All individuals have identical preferences 
























=  where  i y  is gross income,  i w is the wage rate and  i l is labor supply. The price of 
consumption is normalized to 1.  
Since the government cannot observe individual labor supply, a type i worker can 
pretend to be a type j worker and vice versa. That can be done either (i) through a type i   7 
worker works in her own type of work but earning the same income as a type j worker when 
she works in her own type of work (income replication) or (ii) a type 2 worker takes up a 
type 1 work and work in the same fashion as an unskilled worker (job replication). We 
assume that it is technically feasible for skilled workers to take up an unskilled work but it is 
not feasible for an unskilled worker to take up a skilled work. Workers are given incentives 
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where  2 , 1 , = j i . When a type 2 worker earns a higher wage rate than type 1 workers it 
follows that a type 2 worker that earns the same income as a type 1 worker obtains a higher 
utility than a type 1 worker. Therefore, it follows that when income replication does not pay 
for the skilled workers, then job replication does not pay either. 
2.2. Production 
We now turn to production of the consumption good. Essentially only one production 
technology is available. It is given by a strictly concave production function  ) , ( 2 1
p p L L F  in the 
private sector and  ) , ( 2 1
g g L L F α in the public sector, where 
s
t L  indicates number of work hours 
of type t in sector s. The production function exhibits constant returns to scale (CRS) and 
satisfies the Inada-conditions.
10 The parameter α (between 0 and 1) reflects lower efficiency 
in the public sector. CRS implies that we without loss of generality may assume that there is 
only one private firm that earns no pure profit and only one public firm. This is just a 
normalization since we assume competitive conditions on all markets. 
We consider a situation where the government offers the same wages and working 
hours as are present in the private sector for the same type of work. Also, private producers 
take wage rates as given and where wages equate demand and supply for the two types of 
labor. Profit maximization by the private firm implies that  2 , 1 ,









That is, the wage rate of type i workers equals the market value of their marginal 
product in the private sector. In factor intensity form we have, 2 ) ( ' w x f
p =  and 
                                                 




, , , ,
2 1 2 1
= ′ = ′ +∞ = ′ = ′









L L F L L F L L F L L F
g g g g  are assumed to 
hold.   8 





x x F x f
1
2   and ) , 1 ( ) ( ≡ ≡ . This implies that private sector 
production is  ) ( ) , ( 1 2 1
p p p p x f L L L F = . Public sector production is  ) ( ) , ( 1 2 1








2 ≡ . 
2.3. Equilibrium 
Given that only type i workers earn type i income we have the following market-clearing 









l = . Market-clearing on 
the market for the consumer good implies  ) ( ) ( 1 1 2 2 1 1
g g p p x f L x f L c n c n α + = + . 
3. Dominant  policies 
The policy making problem for the government is to choose income before and after tax for 
the two types of workers and the number of workers of the two types that work in public 
production, so as to satisfy the market clearing conditions and to achieve Pareto-efficiency. 
We choose to write the problem as maximization of type 2 worker utility given (i) that type 1 
workers achieve (the feasible) utility level u ˆ , (ii) it does not pay for type 1 (2) workers to 
replicate type 2 (1) income, (iii) the consumption good market clears, (iv) there is no pure 
profit in the private sector, (v) type two worker wage coincides with type two worker 
marginal productivity in the private sector and (vi) type two workers are more productive 
than type 1 workers. The government maximizes over 
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First order conditions to this problem are found in the Appendix. Although we explicitly 
stipulate that the type 2 work wage rate cannot be smaller than the type 1 work wage rate we 
assume that it always holds with strict inequality. That implies  0 = δ  in optimal points.   9 
Let us first note that this problem is not well behaved: In order to apply the Kuhn-
Tucker theorem we need 
2 V  to be strictly concave and all constraints to be quasi-convex. 
The latter condition only holds for the utility constraint on type 1, which is strictly convex 
and for the productivity constraint,  ) ( 2 1 w w − , which is linear. However, the self-selection 
constraints are differences between two concave functions. As a consequence we cannot be 
sure that the Lagrange multipliers  2 1   and   λ λ  are non-negative. However, in the following we 
assume that these multipliers are non-negative. That is also the standard assumption in the 
literature.
11 
The same holds for the multiplier  2 ϕ  which is associated with the wage determining 
condition; it may be either negative, zero or positive. The interpretation of that Lagrange 
multiplier is that it gives the direction of change in the value function when the type 2 wage 
rate increases above its marginal product. Therefore its sign will be essential in determining 
how the policy maker should distinguish herself from the producers in the private sector. 
The solution to the maximization problem can be of different kinds. It can either be a 
first-best Pareto efficient solution (where none of the self-selection constraints are binding) 
or second-best Pareto-efficient where one of the self selection constraints are binding. The 
natural starting point for analysis is the situation where redistribution is limited in the sense 
that the allocation does not deviate much from a laissez-faire equilibrium. Therefore none of 
the self-selection constraints bind. 
Proposition 1.  In a first-best Pareto efficient solution,  0 2 1 = =λ λ , there is no public 
production. That is  0 2 1 = =
g g n n.  
All proofs of propositions are also found in the Appendix. This result is intuitive. 
Redistribution is limited and not driven to far enough to make one of the self-selection 
constraints binding. Then differentiated non-distortionary taxation can be used to carry out 
the redistribution. This is the same type of result as that in the Second Welfare Theorem. 
We now turn our attention to the cases with public production. We can immediately 
dismiss the case with public production such that 
p g x x = . Such factor intensities can never 
                                                 
11 Our main result that there will be public production in a second-best optimum is unaffected by this 
assumption. However, in which direction public sector factor intensity will deviate from that in the private 
sector depends crucially on this assumption.   10 
be a part of a Pareto-efficient solution because of the waste factor α . Reduction of public 
employment will always increase the value of the objective function. 
Proposition 2.  Public production ( ) 2 , 1 , 0 = > i n
g
i  with 
p g x x = is never (constrained) 
Pareto-efficient. 
For public production to make sense it must do something different compared to the private 
sector. Since the same private commodity is produced using the same production technology, 
except for the waste factor, the only thing the government as a producer can do differently is 
to choose a different factor intensity compared to that used in the private sector. Since the 
private sector factor intensity is cost minimizing at going wage rates, public production will 
always generate a loss and require additional tax revenue. If the public sector uses the same 
factor mix as the private sector it would, on the margin, not affect the relative demand for the 
different types of labor. Hence, public production would be costly but generate no gain.  
Proposition 3. In (constrained) Pareto-efficient solutions in which (i) type 1 is favored by 
redistribution  ) 0   and   0 ( 2 1 > = λ λ , public production is such that 
p g x x < , and (ii) type 2 is 
favored by redistribution  ) 0   and   0 ( 1 2 > = λ λ , public production is such that 
p g x x > . 
Hence, public production is always (constrained) Pareto-efficient in a second-best solution. 
Furthermore, the factor intensity will be such that relatively more is used of the factor that is 
favored by redistribution via the tax system. Hence, it will be optimal for the public sector to 
employ type 1 (2) workers beyond the point where their marginal product equals type 1 (2) 
wage rate, if redistribution goes in the direction of type 1 (2) workers. Such an employment 
policy increases the wage of type 1 (2) workers and lowers the need for distortionary 
redistribution via the tax system.  
Finally, let us say something about the results for the optimal non-linear income tax. 
Basically, it can be shown that the present model arrives at the same results as in Stiglitz 
(1982): E.g., for the case of redistribution in favor of type 1 (i.e.,  ) 0   and   0 ( 2 1 > = λ λ ) the 
optimal marginal tax rate for type 2 is negative and for type 1 positive. 
4. Simulations 
In order to explore the potential significance of the hypothesis put forward in this paper we 
have carried out a number of simulations under what we regard as reasonably realistic 
parameter assumptions and for different degrees of redistribution. We have parameterized   11 
the model with CES utility and production functions. The utility function parameters have 
been chosen to, in the laissez fair equilibrium, generate somewhat less than 40 work hours 
per week for unskilled workers and somewhat more than 40 work hours per week for skilled 
workers. The elasticity of substitution has been chosen to generate a small, close to 0.10, 
uncompensated elasticity of labor supply. The latter seems consistent with empirical 
estimates (see Hansson-Brusewitz and Blomquist (1990)). Production function parameters 
have been chosen to generate a wage rate ratio of 1.4 in the laissez-faire equilibrium. That is 
close to the observed difference in the US (see Gottschalk (1997)). For the elasticity of 
substitution between skilled and unskilled workers (worker with or without college degree) 
there are some recent estimates on a macro level (see Krusell, Ohanian, Ríos-Rull and 
Violante, (2000)). A value for the elasticity of substitution of 1.5 seems quite in line with 
their estimates. A parameter, for which there is not much information to obtain in the 
literature, is the relative efficiency of government in-house production. We have chosen 
0.95. A higher value would lead to a larger share of public production while a lower value 
would lead to a smaller share of public production. It is of course possible that there are large 
differences among countries in the relative efficiency of government in-house production of 
particular commodities. But it is not obvious that Denmark, Germany, Norway, Sweden and 
the US are very different in this respect. 
Hence, the simulations have been carried out with the following utility and 
production functions. 
[] p
i i i i l c l c U
1
) 168 )( 1 ( ) , (
ρ ρ β β − − + = , 
[] ν ν ν φ φ
1
2 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 ) )( 1 ( ) ( ) , ( l n n l n n L L F
g g p p − − + − = , 
and 
[] ν ν ν φ φ α α
1
2 2 1 1 2 1 ) 1 ( ) , ( l n l n L L F
g g p p − + = . 
The following parameter values have been used;  29 . 0 = β ,  12 . 0 = ρ ,  4 . 0 = φ ,  3 / 1 = ν  and 
0.95 = α . The number 168 refers to the number of hours in a week. 
The simulation solutions have been carried out in Mathematica: The program used is 
included in the Appendix. To get around the problem of non-uniqueness of solutions to the 
first-order conditions, we made use of the fact that the laissez-faire equilibrium is unique. 
Hence, we first calculated the laissez-faire equilibrium. Then we moved away in small steps   12 
from this equilibrium with starting values close to the earlier equilibrium. Given that the 
optimum solution does not make dramatic jumps that method should guarantee that we 
obtain the global optimum. 
The results of the simulations are presented in Table 2 and Table 3. Table 2 is for the 
case where public employment is not an available instrument. Table 3 is when public 






, decreases from 2.26 to 0 as utilities are equalized. Relative after tax income 
decreases from 64 to 1.7 and relative gross income increases from 1 to 1.8. This pattern 
comes back in Table 3, which also shows Pareto-efficient levels of public employment. 
Hence starting in a situation where redistribution favors skilled workers, the public sector 
tilts skill intensity in favor of skilled workers. Moreover, moving to solutions (down in the 
table) where skilled workers are less favored public employment shrinks to disappear in the 
segment where no incentive compatibility constraint is binding. When the self-selection 
constraint binds for type 2 workers the redistribution goes in favor of unskilled workers. In 
that segment public employment is again interesting but now the skill intensity is tilted in 
favor of unskilled workers. It is interesting to note that increased equality can easily result in 
public employment, which is up to about 9% of total employment. Hence, it seems that the 
hypothesis put forward in this paper has potential to explain rather much of between country 
differences in public employment.  
Tables 2 and 3 about here. 
There are also a few other things that are interesting to note about the simulations. 
Wage rate inequality is at its largest value when redistribution in favor of skilled workers is 
driven very far. Wages are equalized when utilities are equalized. Gross incomes are 
equalized when redistribution in favor of skilled workers is driven very far. Gross income 
inequality is at its largest when redistribution is in favor of the unskilled is at its largest but it 
is still modest (i.e., less than 50 per cent). When redistribution is driven further in that 
direction gross income inequality is reduced. The result that gross income inequality is larger 
when there is large redistribution in favor of the unskilled than in the laissez faire 
equilibrium seems not to accord with reality. The technical explanation is that low skilled 
work time decreases significantly. In reality not all low skilled workers are employed and 
therefore a possible interpretation of that result is that the income represents an average 
among low skilled workers.   13 
5. Concluding  Comments 
The aim of this paper is to put forward a new hypothesis on public employment, namely that 
public employment may serve the purpose to mitigate labor market distortions created by 
taxation. The analysis is in a context of a model with two types of workers and where the 
public sector produces the same commodities as the private sector but with a somewhat 
lower efficiency. The only constraint on taxes and transfers is that the government cannot 
observe individual worker productivity. The result is that whenever incentive compatibility 
constraints affect tax schedules, distortions can be reduced by means of public employment. 
The public sector should distinguish itself from the private sector by employing a larger 
share of workers of the types favored by redistribution policy than would the private sector. 
Such an employment policy increases wages and thereby welfare of the favored types of 
workers, which relives the tax and transfer policies from some burden. 
In a more realistic context where there are several types of workers, which are rather 
close to each other in terms of productivity, incentive compatibility constraints will almost 
always affect tax schedules. The implication is that whenever a government wants to 
redistribute income there will almost always also be an argument for production inefficiency 
and public employment. 
The simulation results show, under somewhat realistic parameter constellations, that 
public employment is not negligible. This implies that political programs that amounts to 
achieving redistribution may for efficiency reasons also include significant elements of 
government production and employment. Political programs in which large scale 
redistribution is not a prominent element could therefore be expected to not politicize the 
issue of public vs. private ownership of certain production facilities. That is potentially an 
important explanation for the large differences in the shares of government employment 
among the advanced OECD countries. 
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Appendix 
A.1. First order conditions 






























g = , the first order conditions needed to derive 
the results regarding public production can be written as follows: 
, 0 ) ( ' '
) ( ' ) (























x f x x f







y y ϕ α γ λ µ λ  (1) 
, 0 ) ( ' '
) ( '































y y ϕ α γ λ λ  (2) 
, 0 ) ( ' '
) ( ' ) (
















































, 0 ) ( ' ' 1
) ( '



























































and 0 , 0 ) ( ' ' 1

































ϕ α γ  (5) 
































ϕ α γ  (6) 
A.2. Proofs 
Note first that one can show that γ >0 (i.e., it is never optimal to have some resources 
unused and more resources would increase the value of the objective function) and µ <0 
(i.e., type 1 will be on its exogenously given utility level, the reduction of which would 
increase the value of the objective). Throughout we consider solutions such that  1 2 w w >  and 
therefore  0 = δ .   16 
Proof of Proposition 1: Suppose no self-selection constraint is binding so that  0 2 1 = = λ λ . 





 and subtract the result from equation (1). The result implies 





−  and subtract the result from equation (2). The result 
implies 0 2 = ϕ . Suppose also there is some public production so that  2 , 1 0 = > i n
g
i . Using 
0 2 1 2 1 = = = = ϕ ϕ λ λ  and the first order conditions for cost minimization in the private 
sector, i.e.,  2 ) ( ' w x f
p =  and 
p p x w w x f 2 1 ) ( + = , equations (5) and (6) implies 
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Hence, the factor intensity in the public sector is the same as that in the private sector. 
However, since the public producer replicates cost minimization it follows from equation (5) 
and (6) that  0 ) 1 ( < − − =
∂
∂





 contradicting an interior solution for the public demand of 
both types of labour. Hence, there is no interior solution with  0 2 1 = = λ λ , which proves 
Proposition 1.  
Proof of Proposition 2: Consider a solution with public production so that 
2 , 1 0 = > i n
g
i . Suppose also that 
p g x x = . From equations (5) and (6) then immediately 
follows that  2 ϕ  is both strictly positive and strictly negative in the optimal point. A 
contradiction and therefore 
p g x x ≠  if optimality implies public production. Hence, 
Proposition 2 follows. 
Proof of Proposition 3: Since the production function satisfies the Inada-conditions, c.f., 
footnote 9, it follows directly from the first order conditions (5) and (6) that any interior 
solution to 
g n1  or 
g n2  is ruled out given an appropriate choice of 
g x  such that 
p g x x ≠ ; i.e., 
the value of the objective function can always be increased if the public sector uses both 
types of labor at a different factor intensity than the private sector. 
Consider then the case when redistribution favors type 1, i.e.,  0 1 = λ  and  0 2 > λ . 
From above we know that  0 1 >
g n  and  0 2 >











−  and subtract the result from equation (2). The result implies  0 2 > ϕ . In an interior 
solution the first order conditions with respect to 
g n1  and 
g n2 , equations (5) and (6), can be 
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The implication then is that 
p g x x < when 0 1 = λ and 0 2 > λ . The proof for the case when 
0 1 > λ  and  0 2 = λ . (.i.e., when redistribution favors type 2) is completely analogous and 
therefore omitted, but then instead 
p g x x > . That proves Proposition 3. 
A.3 Mathematica  program 
The following Mathematica notebook simulates our model for CES utility and production 
functions given the parameter values given in the program. For our simulation procedure, see 
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Table 2: Simulations without public production 
1 V  
2 V   T   1 c   2 c   1 y   2 y   1 w   2 w  
g n1  
g n2  
3.00  106.51  0.00 1.33  85.39  42.89  43.83 0.26 0.85 0.00 0.00 
23.00  98.50 0.00 12.28 71.13 39.54 43.87  0.28  0.78  0.00  0.00 
33.00  95.63 0.00 17.20 60.94 36.63 41.51  0.29  0.77  0.00  0.00 
43.00  93.28 0.00 20.29 50.34 32.84 37.78  0.30  0.75  0.00  0.00 
48.00  92.20 0.00 20.87 45.19 30.59 35.47  0.30  0.75  0.00  0.00 
52.00  91.31 0.00 20.81 41.25 28.60 33.45  0.30  0.74  0.00  0.00 
62.00  88.61 0.00 18.73 32.35 22.94 28.14  0.32  0.71  0.00  0.00 
72.00  83.76 0.00 15.21 25.93 16.75 24.40  0.39  0.61  0.00  0.00 
72.23  83.60 1.47 15.15 25.84 16.62 24.37  0.39  0.61  0.00  0.00 
72.34  83.51 1.40 15.20 25.78 16.60 24.38  0.39  0.61  0.00  0.00 
72.68  83.28 1.20 15.34 25.62 16.54 24.42  0.39  0.61  0.00  0.00 
73.01  83.04 1.00 15.49 25.46 16.49 24.46  0.39  0.61  0.00  0.00 
73.34  82.80 0.80 15.64 25.31 16.44 24.51  0.40  0.60  0.00  0.00 
73.66  82.56 0.60 15.79 25.15 16.39 24.55  0.40  0.60  0.00  0.00 
73.99  82.32 0.40 15.94 24.99 16.34 24.59  0.40  0.60  0.00  0.00 
74.31  82.08 0.20 16.09 24.84 16.29 24.64  0.40  0.60  0.00  0.00 
74.64  81.83 0.00 16.24 24.68 16.24 24.68  0.41  0.59  0.00  0.00 
74.96  81.59  -0.20 16.39 24.53 16.19 24.73  0.41  0.59  0.00  0.00 
75.28  81.35  -0.40 16.55 24.38 16.15 24.78  0.41  0.59  0.00  0.00 
75.60  81.11  -0.60 16.70 24.23 16.10 24.83  0.41  0.59  0.00  0.00 
75.91  80.86  -0.80 16.86 24.08 16.06 24.88  0.42  0.58  0.00  0.00 
75.92  80.86  -0.81 16.86 24.07 16.06 24.88  0.42  0.58  0.00  0.00 
76.00  80.80 0.00 16.80 24.07 15.99 24.87  0.42  0.58  0.00  0.00 
76.50  80.38 0.00 16.37 24.06 15.57 24.86  0.43  0.57  0.00  0.00 
77.00  79.89 0.00 15.87 24.06 15.09 24.84  0.45  0.56  0.00  0.00 
77.50  79.31 0.00 15.30 24.10 14.55 24.85  0.47  0.54  0.00  0.00 
78.00  78.52 0.00 14.55 24.22 13.87 24.91  0.50  0.52  0.00  0.00 
78.16  78.16 0.00 14.24 24.31 13.59 24.96  0.52  0.52  0.00  0.00   21 
Table 3: Simulations with public production 
1 V  
2 V   T   1 c   2 c   1 y   2 y   1 w   2 w  
g n1  
g n2  
3.00  111.78  0.00 0.39  58.02  30.16  31.16 0.19 1.26 0.37 0.57 
10.00  109.73  0.00 1.32  54.54  28.04  30.96 0.19 1.23 0.43 0.63 
20.00  106.61  0.00 2.74  49.73  25.31  30.42 0.20 1.17 0.48 0.68 
30.00  103.21  0.00 4.35  45.03  22.86  29.69 0.21 1.09 0.51 0.69 
40.00  99.43  0.00 6.26  40.41  20.73  28.83 0.22 0.99 0.49 0.68 
50.00  95.15  0.00 8.70  35.89  19.10  27.87 0.25 0.88 0.41 0.60 
68.00  86.14 0.00 16.20 27.99 18.89 25.38  0.35  0.67  0.01  0.03 
72.23  83.60 1.47 15.15 25.84 16.62 24.37  0.39  0.61  0.00  0.00 
72.34  83.51 1.40 15.20 25.78 16.60 24.38  0.39  0.61  0.00  0.00 
72.68  83.28 1.20 15.34 25.62 16.54 24.42  0.39  0.61  0.00  0.00 
73.01  83.04 1.00 15.49 25.46 16.49 24.46  0.39  0.61  0.00  0.00 
73.34  82.80 0.80 15.64 25.31 16.44 24.51  0.40  0.60  0.00  0.00 
73.66  82.56 0.60 15.79 25.15 16.39 24.55  0.40  0.60  0.00  0.00 
73.99  82.32 0.40 15.94 24.99 16.34 24.59  0.40  0.60  0.00  0.00 
74.31  82.08 0.20 16.09 24.84 16.29 24.64  0.40  0.60  0.00  0.00 
74.64  81.83 0.00 16.24 24.68 16.24 24.68  0.41  0.59  0.00  0.00 
74.96  81.59  -0.20 16.39 24.53 16.19 24.73  0.41  0.59  0.00  0.00 
75.28  81.35  -0.40 16.55 24.38 16.15 24.78  0.41  0.59  0.00  0.00 
75.60  81.11  -0.60 16.70 24.23 16.10 24.83  0.41  0.59  0.00  0.00 
75.91  80.86  -0.80 16.86 24.08 16.06 24.88  0.42  0.58  0.00  0.00 
75.92  80.86  -0.81 16.86 24.07 16.06 24.88  0.42  0.58  0.00  0.00 
78.08  78.35 0.00 14.40 24.26 13.73 24.93  0.51  0.52  0.00  0.00 
78.10  78.31 0.00 14.51 24.20 13.92 24.88  0.51  0.52  0.03  0.01 
78.15  78.22 0.00 14.75 24.06 14.34 24.75  0.51  0.52  0.10  0.05 
78.17  78.18 0.00 14.84 24.01 14.49 24.70  0.51  0.52  0.13  0.06 
78.17  78.17 0.00 14.85 24.01 14.51 24.70  0.52  0.52  0.13  0.06 